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Article
California Supreme Court Review of
Decisions of the Public Utilities
Commission-Is the Court's Denial
of a Writ of Review a Decision
on the Merits?
by
BORIS H. LAKUSTA*
and DAVID H. RENTON**
Over seventy-five years ago, the Public Utilities Act of 19121 im-
posed upon the California Supreme Court the obligation to review deci-
sions of the California Railroad Commission, now known as the
California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC).2 The Act was amended
in 1933, adding language to remove doubt about the sufficiency of the
protection afforded constitutional rights by the California Supreme
Court's review.3 Apart from this addition, the provisions for review have
remained essentially unchanged since 1912.
* Partner, Graham & James, San Francisco, California; Member, California Bar. A.B.
1933, Harvard University; LL.B. 1936, Harvard Law School; LL.M. 1938, Stanford Law
School.
** Member of California Bar engaged at McKenna & Co., London, England; B.A. 1973,
Sussex University; J.D. 1976, Boalt Hall School of Law, University of California, Berkeley.
The authors are especially indebted to Arthur T. George, Esq., former Chief Counsel of
the California Railroad Commission and former General Solicitor of The Pacific Telephone &
Telegraph Co., for valuable historical information and advice.
1. Public Utilities Act, ch. 91, 1915 Cal. Stat. 115 (original version at ch. 20, 1911 Cal.
Stat. 13).
2. The name of the Commission was changed from Railroad Commission to Public Util-
ities Commission by amendment, adopted on November 5, 1946, CAL. CONST. art. XII, § 22
(current version as amended at CAL. CONST. art. XII, §§ 1-9 (1974)). The Commission is
referred to in this article from time to time as the CPUC.
3. Act of May 18, 1933, ch. 442, 1933 Cal. Stat. 1157 (current version at CAL. PUB.
UTIL. CODE § 1760 (Deering 1970)). The United States Supreme Court delineated these stan-
dards in Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 287, 289-91 (1920).
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In 1951, the review provisions were incorporated into the California
Public Utilities Code sections 1756, 1757, and 1760.4 Section 1756 pro-
vides that after exhaustion of the administrative remedy
the applicant may apply to the Supreme Court of this state for a writ of
certiorari or review for the purpose of having the lawfulness of the
original order or decision or of the order or decision on rehearing in-
quired into and determined. The writ shall be made returnable at a
time and place then or thereafter specified by court order and shall
direct the commission to certify its record in the case to the court
within the time therein specified.'
Section 1757 provides:
No new or additional evidence may be introduced in the Supreme
Court, but the cause shall be heard on the record of the commission as
certified to by it. The review shall not be extended further than to
determine whether the commission has regularly pursued its authority,
including a determination of whether the order or decision under re-
view violates any right of the petitioner under the Constitution of the
United States or of this State.
The findings and conclusions of the commission on questions of
fact shall be final and shall not be subject to review except as provided
in this article. Such questions of fact shall include ultimate facts and
the findings and conclusions of the commission on reasonableness and
discrimination. 6
Section 1760 embodies the language added to the Act in 1933:
In any proceeding wherein the validity of any order or decision is
challenged on the ground that it violates any right of petitioner under
the Constitution of the United States, the Supreme Court shall exercise
an independent judgment on the law and the facts, and the findings or
conclusions of the commission material to the determination of the
constitutional question shall not be final. 7
The prescribed method of direct access to the California Supreme
Court is by petition for "writ of certiorari or review,"' 8 rather than by
appeal. The California Supreme Court, however, holds the exclusive re-
view authority. Section 1759 of the Public Utilities Code provides that
"No court of this State, except the Supreme Court to the extent specified
in this article, shall have jurisdiction to review, reverse, correct, or annul
any order or decision of the Commission .. .
When the California Supreme Court grants a petition for writ of
4. Act of May 31, 1951, ch. 764, 1951 Cal. Stat. 2025 (current version at CAL. PUB.
UTIL. CODE §§ 1757, 1760 (Deering 1970 & Supp. 1988)).
5. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 1756 (Deering Supp. 1988).
6. Id. § 1757 (Deering 1970).
7. Id. § 1760.
8. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
9. § 1759.
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review of a CPUC decision, the judicial remedy satisfies the relevant con-
stitutional and statutory requirements. 10 The court receives the record,
hears argument, and renders an opinion setting forth its reasoning. If
legal issues are determined, the decision is given both res judicata and
stare decisis effect.
In some ninety percent of the cases coming up from the CPUC,
however, the court denies the petition for a writ of review." In such
cases, the court does not have the record before it, does not hear oral
argument, and issues its denial witlout opinion or explanation. Despite
these limitations the United States Supreme Court held, in a decision
rendered a few years after passage of the Public Utilities Act of 1912,
that denial of the writ in that particular case was a determination on the
merits.12 For nearly sixty years thereafter, the California Supreme Court
interpreted that case as holding that denial of a writ is always a determi-
nation on the merits.
What prompted this sweeping interpretation? Did the California
Supreme Court, as it became increasingly burdened with cases, strike an
internal, unspoken compromise not long after enactment of the Public
Utilities Act--characterizing a denial of a writ of review as a "decision
on the merits" to satisfy the constitutional and statutory right of parties
to a determination by a court of law, but in fact treating the issuance of
these writs as discretionary, indistinguishable from the treatment ac-
corded petitions for writs of review emanating from actions of lower
courts?
This Article examines the historical development of cases involving
the California Supreme Court's review of CPUC decisions, which leads
one to think that the answer is yes. Following an analysis of the relevant
cases in section I, section II discusses the several unsatisfactory conse-
quences of the court's practice of denial-without-opinion. Finally, sec-
tion III presents both short-term and long-term remedies for the
California Supreme Court's present, undesirable practice.
I. Case Law Until 1979
In the first few years after passage of the Public Utilities Act, the
California Supreme Court rendered a written opinion in all utility cases
coming before it, including those in which a petition for writ of rpejie$;
10. See infra notes 46-51 and accompanying text.
11. The authors have derived this figure by examining the records of the CPUC vir~a
period of approximately forty years. See Comment, The California Supreme Court and;Selec-
tive Review, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 720, 722 (1984).
12. Napa Valley Elec. Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 251 U.S. 366, 373 (1920).
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was denied.' 3 It was not long, however, before the court developed the
practice, when it denied such a petition, of issuing a minute order with-
out opinion-an order containing the single word "Denied," devoid of
explanation or articulated reason.
A few years after the passage of the Public Utilities Act of 1912, the
California Supreme Court decided Napa Valley Electric Co. v. Railroad
Commission. 14 In that case, the electric company had petitioned for writ
of review on the ground that a Railroad Commission order fixing rates
lower than those agreed to by contract violated the electric company's
rights under article I, sections 10 and 14 of the United States Constitu-
tion. The California Supreme Court denied the petition without opin-
ion. 15 The electric company then went to the federal district court to
enjoin the Commission from enforcing the rate order. The district court
dismissed the action on the ground that the California Supreme Court's
denial of the petition rendered the issue res judicata. 16 On appeal, the
United States Supreme Court affirmed. 17
The electric company contended Shat the California Supreme
Court's denial of the petition could not be res judicata because no writ of
review was issued, no hearing was held on a certified record, and no or-
der was issued setting aside or affirming the Commission's decision. The
United States Supreme Court rejected this contention, observing that
"insistence upon the literalism of the statute meets in resistance the com-
mon, and at times, necessary practice of courts to determine upon the
face of a pleading what action should be taken upon it."",
The United States Supreme Court then concluded that the Califor-
nia Supreme Court had itself interpreted the Public Utilities Act as not
requiring the issuance of a writ of review in every case to render a court
decision res judicata. 19 This opinion recognized that in some cases a
court could decide, simply upon the face of the pleadings, that the Com-
mission regularly pursued its authority, and thus, simply denying the
writ would be sufficient.
13. These opinions were very brief indeed, often no more than a single paragraph. See,
e.g., City of Santa Monica v. Railroad Comm'n, 179 Cal. 467, 177 P. 989 (1918); E. Clemens
Horst Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 175 Cal. 660, 166 P. 804 (1917); C.A. Hooper & Co. v. Rail-
road Comm'n, 175 Cal. 811, 165 P. 689 (1917) (mem.); City of Pasadena v. Railroad Comm'n,
175 Cal. 812, 166 P. 356 (1917) (mem.).
14. 174 Cal. 411, 163 P. 497 (1917).
15. Id. at 411, 163 P. at 497.
16. Napa Valley Elec. Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 257 F. 197, 199 (N.D. Cal. 1919), afid,
251 U.S. 366 (1920).
17. Napa Valley Elec. Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 251 U.S. 366, 373 (1920).
18. Id. at 372.
19. Id.
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In reaching this conclusion the United States Supreme Court relied
on four California Supreme Court decisions denying petitions for writ of
review, which were accompanied with an opinion. In one case, Ghriest v.
Railroad Commission, the California court held that the Commission's
assumed failure to require notice was cured when the Commission gave
the complaining party an opportunity to be heard-the failure did not
warrant holding that the Commission had failed to regularly pursue its
authority.20 The second case, Mt. Konocti Light & Power Co. v. Thelen,
held that there was no substantial departure by the Commission from the
procedure provided by the Public Utilities Act, and therefore no basis for
granting a writ of review. 21 The third case, E. Clemens Horst Co. v. Rail-
road Commission, denied a writ because the Commission's order merely
directed a railroad to enforce its tariff and did not attempt to adjudicate
liability to the railroad.22 Finally, in Hooper & Co. v. Railroad Commis-
sion, the court denied a petition for writ of review because the Commis-
sion's order did not deprive consumers of any prior right.23
Based on its reference to these four cases, one may reasonably con-
clude that the United States Supreme Court meant simply that in some
situations the merits can be determined from the face of the pleadings,
making the issuance of a writ an idle gesture. The California Supreme
Court had so interpreted the statute respecting its review authority, thus
allowing the denial of a writ in those situations to have res judicata effect.
Notwithstanding the likelihood that the United States Supreme
Court intended its decision to have this limited meaning, for nearly sixty
years Napa Valley Electric was interpreted as holding that a denial of a
writ of review of a CPUC decision is always a determination on the mer-
its, having both res judicata and stare decisis effect. This interpretation
prevailed although it was obviously difficult in some cases to fathom how
the California Supreme Court could make an intelligent determination
on the merits without having the record before it and without the benefit
of oral argument. In its 1936 decision of Southern California Edison Co.
v. Railroad Commission, the court might have cast doubt on the prevail-
ing interpretation, but instead held that the 1933 addition to the review
provisions of the Public Utilities Act "did not, in any substantial degree,
change the rules in force prior thereto."'24
20. 170 Cal. 63, 63, 148 P. 195, 195 (1915).
21. 170 Cal. 468, 470, 150 P. 359, 360 (1915).
22. 175 Cal. 660, 661, 166 P. 804, 804 (1917).
23. 175 Cal. 811, 811, 165 P. 689, 689 (1917).
24. 6 Cal. 2d 737, 746, 59 P.2d 808, 812 (1936).
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People v. Western Air Lines,25 decided in 1954, also contributed to a
broad reading of Napa Valley Electric. In that case, the state brought an
action in the superior court to collect statutory penalties from the airline
for failure to charge the fares prescribed by the CPUC. The superior
court dismissed the action, holding that the CPUC lacked jurisdiction to
fix the rates of an airline.26 The California Supreme Court reversed on
the ground that the CPUC had determined in a prior proceeding that it
did have such jurisdiction and that jurisdiction had been sustained by the
California Supreme Court's denial of a writ of review without opinion in
Western Air Lines v. Public Utilities Commission.27 The court in People v.
Western Air Lines relied on Southern California Edison Company for the
proposition that a denial of a writ "is a decision on the merits both as to
the law and the facts presented in the review proceedings, '2 8 and on
Napa Valley Electric for the proposition that "[t]his is so even though the
order of this court is without opinion."' 29 Because there was an identity
of issues and parties, the matter was res judicata. 30
Despite the court's position that the prior denial of the writ without
opinion in Western Air Lines v. Public Utilities Commission was a deci-
sion on the merits of the issues presented in the instant case, the court in
People v. Western Air Lines proceeded to list those issues and to discuss
the relevant legal principles, thereby supplying the explanation which the
parties had failed to obtain in the earlier proceeding. 3I Logically there
was no need in People v. Western Air Lines to do more than recite the
issues and declare that they had been resolved by the de-
nial-without-opinion in the cognate case. One wonders if the court was
uncomfortable with the notion that issues of such serious magnitude
could really be resolved properly without a full record and oral argu-
ment, followed by a written opinion. In any case, the unusual circum-
stance of the penalty proceeding in the superior court, followed by
25. 42 Cal. 2d 621, 268 P.2d 723, appeal dismissed, 348 U.S. 859 (1954).
26. Id. at 629, 268 P.2d at 730.
27. Id. at 630, 642-43, 268 P.2d at 728, 735-36 (noting Western Air Lines v. Public Util.
Comm'n, S.F. No. 18,427 (Aug. 2, 1951) (order denying petition for writ of review)).
28. Id. at 630, 268 P.2d at 728 (citing Southern California Edison Co. v. Railroad
Comm'n, 6 Cal. 2d 737, 747, 59 P.2d 808, 812 (1936)).
29. Id. at 630-31, 268 P.2d at 728 (citing Napa Valley Electric Co. v. Railroad Comm'n,
251 U.S. 366, 372-73 (1920)).
30. Id. at 630, 268 P.2d at 728.
31. As stated by the court, the issues in question were: (1) whether the CPUC had juris-
diction to fix intrastate fares of an air carrier operating in interstate and intrastate commerce,
(2) whether the airline was a public utility within the meaning of the state constitution, and (3)
whether state jurisdiction had been preempted by the federal Civil Aeronautics Act. Id. at
629-30, 268 P.2d at 728. The California Supreme Court in this instance did have the benefit of
the record and oral argument in the superior court proceeding below.
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appeal, did supply the elements of a hearing and a record, and the court
did write a full opinion. As the court explained:
Since the conclusions on this appeal ... are to be the same as those
which to that extent formed the basis for the order denying the writ,
... it is deemed desirable to state all of the reasons ... to the end that
none of the reasons for such denial be left to implication or conjecture.32
The court seems to recognize, by this comment, the essential unfair-
ness of the denial-without-opinion procedure when important issues are
involved. Why should parties ever be compelled to resort to inference
and conjecture respecting the basis for the supreme court's action?
Would not the court want parties to know the grounds on which it de-
nied the writ? Most importantly, would not the court be more likely to
give careful attention to the issues if it had to provide written reasoning
for all to see?
Despite apparent discomfort with the issuance of denials-without-
opinion, the court continued the practice. It was not until 1979 that the
court in Consumers Lobby Against Monopolies v. Public Utilities Commis-
sion partially destroyed the prior interpretation by holding that a denial-
without-opinion is res judicata but does not have the impact of stare deci-
sis.33 In the CPUC proceedings, representatives of ratepayer interests
challenged rates proposed by the Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Com-
pany. Each of those participants sought an award of attorney fees. The
issues were: (1) whether the CPUC had power to award attorney fees in
a quasi-judicial proceeding; (2) whether in such a proceeding a non-attor-
ney representative would be eligible for attorney fees; and (3) whether the
CPUC had power to award attorney fees in a quasi-legislative rate mak-
ing proceeding. 34
The CPUC held that it lacked power to award attorney fees.35 Peti-
tions for a writ of review were granted by the California Supreme Court.
The CPUC and Pacific Telephone both contended that the court had
previously decided the issue in the negative by denying several prior peti-
tions for writs of review and that the court should rely on these denials
under the doctrine of stare decisis. 36
In holding that a denial of a writ to review a CPUC decision makes
the matter res judicata only, and not stare decisis, 37 the court sought to
extricate itself from a dilemma. On the one hand, it recognized that it is
32. Id. at 633, 268 P.2d at 730 (emphasis added).
33. 25 Cal. 3d 891, 901-02, 603 P.2d 41, 47, 160 Cal. Rptr. 124, 130 (1979).
34. Id. at 897, 603 P.2d at 44, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 127.
35. Id. at 906, 603 P.2d at 57, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 140.
36. Id. at 899, 603 P.2d at 45, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 128.
37. Id at 902, 603 P.2d at 47, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 130.
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the only California court empowered to review CPUC decisions. It
must, therefore, make a determination on the merits when a petition for
writ of review is filed if the petitioner is to be accorded the right to a law
court determination-a right to which the petitioner may be entitled
under the state and federal constitutions. 38 On the other hand, the court
wanted to continue, and perhaps justify, the policy of limiting the in-
stances in which it would engage in the time consuming process of exam-
ining the record, hearing oral argument, and rendering a formal opinion.
Thus, the court resorted to a fiction: if it denies without opinion a peti-
tion for writ of review, and such denial is not, in fact, a decision on the
merits, such denial will nevertheless be "deemed a decision on the mer-
its."' 39 As such, it will be entitled to less respect than a decision actually
on the merits, in that the doctrine of res judicata will apply, but the doc-
trine of stare decisis will not. As the court explained:
The sole means provided by law for judicial review of a commission
decision is a petition to this court for writ of review ... which thereby
serves in effect the office of an appeal. If our ruling on such a petition
were not a final "decision on the merits both as to the law and the facts
presented," the parties would be denied their right to such review. Be-
cause it must therefore be deemed a decision on the merits, our denial
of such a petition raises the bar of res judicata against relitigation of
the same cause of action between the same parties or their privies.4°
The court attempted to explain why stare decisis does not apply
even though the denial is "deemed" on the merits:
As we have seen, the merits of the decision may well be procedural
rather than substantive; yet because there is no opinion, its ratio
decidendi does not appear on its face. It would therefore be sheer spec-
ulation for litigants to rely on such decisions as precedents. In addi-
tion, such reliance may well prove a trap for the unwary: members of
the public who have potentially meritorious petitions for review to
present to this court may be dissuaded from doing so by the mere fact
that we declined to take an earlier case allegedly raising the same
question. 41
In short, the court resorted to semantic .rationalization, using the
phrase "on the merits" to extend even to procedural matters. Accord-
ingly, a denial "on the merits" may be based on procedural grounds,
such as failure to raise the issue below, failure to file the petition on time,
or failure to recognize that the issue has become moot.
Again, one must ask: Why does the court drive litigants to guess
what "merits" formed the basis of the court's decision? The excerpt
38. See 5 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 28:3, at 259-61 (2d ed. 1978).
39. Consumers Lobby, 25 Cal. 3d at 901, 603 P.2d at 46, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 129.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 905, 603 P.2d at 49, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 132.
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quoted above suggests that, in a given case, there may be no principled
basis for the decision and the denial may be purely an act of discretion.
II. Deficiencies in the Practice of Denial-Without-Opinion
The court's practice of denial-without-opinion of petitions for writ
of review of CPUC decisions leads to several problems-problems exac-
erbated by the court's indulgence in the fiction that these denials are
"deemed to be on the merits." This section considers several deficiencies
in this practice: (A) failure to reveal the grounds for a denial; (B) failure
to meet statutory requirements; (C) failure to observe requirements of the
California Constitution; (D) failure to provide a "plain, speedy and effi-
cient remedy" for rate cases within the meaning of the Johnson Act of
1934; (E) failure to provide assurance of judicial review on the merits to
protect federal rights; and (F) failure to justify abstention from exercise
of jurisdiction by the federal district court.
A. Failure to Reveal Grounds for Denial
The most obvious objection to the denial-without-opinion practice is
that while it purportedly results in a decision by the supreme court on
the merits, there is no way of discovering the court's reasoning. Did the
court agree with the rationale for each issue raised, or only with the con-
clusion? Did the court possibly deny the petition on a procedural ground
pleaded by a party or raised by the court on its own initiative? Finally,
did the court deny the petition for an administrative reason, such as an
overcrowded calendar, which would normally fail to qualify as being "on
the merits"? One is left to speculate.
When a court has discretion to grant or deny a petition without
reference to the merits, as in the case of a petition for a writ of certiorari
to the United States Supreme Court, it is acceptable that the court deny
such a petition simply by an order without opinion. This practice seems
reasonable since the court's motivations in this instance are of little sig-
nificance to the parties. When the court's action is based on the merits,
however, the considerations are very different; in those situations, an un-
derstanding of the court's reasoning can help a party decide what subse-
quent steps to take. Such knowledge can also guide future parties faced
with similar issues.
Knowledge of the court's reasoning is just as valuable when a writ is
denied on the merits as it is when the court grants a writ, hears oral
argument, and writes an opinion. In the former case, it may be that the
circumstances may justify only an abbreviated decision, but at a bare
minimum the parties should be entitled to know whether the court
August 1988]
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agreed with the commission's reasoning on each issue or only with the
conclusion. Moreover, the parties should be informed whether the denial
was based solely on a procedural ground such as lack of standing or the
expiration of the applicable statute of limitations. Finally, if the denial
was based on administrative considerations such as an overcrowded cal-
endar, the parties should be entitled to know that fact.
A California court of appeal in People v. Rojas expressed the value of
an articulated decision by a reviewing court: "In our opinion, the re-
quirement [of a written opinion] is designed to insure that the reviewing
court gives careful thought and consideration to the case and that the
statement of reasons indicates that appellant's contentions have been re-
viewed and consciously, as distinguished from inadvertently, rejected."'42
The California Supreme Court has recognized the value of requiring
an administrative body, notably the CPUC, to articulate the basis for its
conclusions. In California Motor Transport Co. v. Public Utilities Com-
mission, Justice Traynor, speaking for the court, quoted Professor Davis
with approval: " '[A] disappointed party, whether he plans further pro-
ceedings or not, deserves to have the satisfaction of knowing why he lost
his case.' ,,43 Justice Traynor also emphasized that findings on material
issues would be helpful to anyone planning activities involving similar
questions and could also help prevent careless or arbitrary action by the
deciding body. 44
One must conclude that the California Supreme Court, while recog-
nizing the importance of articulated reasoning by the CPUC, has, by the
denial-without-opinion process, adopted a lesser requirement for its own
actions.
B. Failure to Meet Statutory Requirements
As early as 1920, counsel argued before the United States Supreme
Court in Napa Valley Electric that considering a summary denial of a
petition for review of a Railroad Commission order to be a judgment on
the merits and thus given res judicata effect is not consistent with the
judicial review provisions of the Public Utilities Act.45 These provisions,
now incorporated in the Public Utilities Code, provide that judicial re-
42. 118 Cal. App. 3d 288, 288-89, 174 Cal. Rptr. 91, 92, denying reh'g to 118 Cal. App.
3d 278, 173 Cal. Rptr. 64 (1981).
43. 59 Cal. 2d 270, 274, 379 P.2d 324, 327, 28 Cal. Rptr. 868, 871 (1963) (quoting 2 K.
DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 16.05, at 448 (1958)).
44. Id.
45. Napa Valley Elec. Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 251 U.S. 366, 371 (1920).
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view may be had only from the California Supreme Court46 by means of
an application for a writ of certiorari or review.47 The writ shall direct
the CPUC to certify its record to the supreme court48 and the cause shall
be heard on the record of the CPUC as certified by it.4 9 Further, the
CPUC and each party to the action or proceeding before the CPUC may
appear in the review proceeding and, upon the hearing, the supreme
court shall enter a judgment either affirming or setting aside the CPUC
decision.50 The provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure relating to pre-
rogative writs of review apply to the extent they are compatible with the
provisions of the Public Utilities Act.51
The court does not observe these essential elements of the review
procedure when a petition for writ of review is summarily denied without
opinion. First, the record of the CPUC proceeding is not certified to the
supreme court. Second, there is no hearing, in the sense of oral argument
before the court, although oral argument is required by the state consti-
tution in all cases in which the court issues a judgment on the merits52
unless oral argument is waived.5 3 Third, the court does not enter a judg-
ment either affirming or setting aside the CPUC decision but enters a
minute order that the petition for writ of review is denied. Finally, the
Code of Civil Procedure relating to writs of review54 is not followed, par-
tidularly since the court does not enter a judgment on the merits of a
petition for a prerogative writ unless it grants at least an alternative
writ.55
Counsel for the Napa Valley Electric Company argued that since
the Public Utilities Act prohibits judicial review of. Commission orders
other than in the manner specified in the Act, a summary denial of a
petition for review could not be treated as a judgment on the merits but
rather must be understood as a decision by the court to exercise its dis-
cretion not to grant judicial review.56 While the United States Supreme
46. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 1759 (Deering 1970); see supra text accompanying note 9.
47. § 1756 (Deering Supp. 1988); see supra text accompanying note 5.
48. Id.
49. § 1757 (Deering 1970); see supra text accompanying note 6.
50. § 1758.
51. Id.
52. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 2; see Metropolitan Water Dist. v. Adams, 19 Cal. 2d 463,
468, 122 P.2d 257, 259 (1942).
53. CAL. R. CT. 28(g); Op. LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL, 1966 JOURNAL OF THE SENATE
1047-48.
54. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1067-1077 (Deering 1973).
55. Funeral Directors Ass'n v. Board of Funeral Directors, 22 Cal. 2d 104, 106, 136 P.2d
785, 786 (1943); Board of Equalization v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 2d 467, 470-71, 127 P.2d 4, 7
(1942).
56. Napa Valley Elec. Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 251 U.S. 366, 371 (1920).
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Court rejected this argument, it may have intended to hold only (1) that
there are situations in which the grant of a writ would be an idle gesture,
and (2) that the California Supreme Court had itself recognized that in
such situations there is no need to observe the literalism of the statute by
going through the motions of granting a writ and receiving oral argu-
ment. 57 Despite this probably limited holding, Napa Valley Electric was
construed, until Consumers Lobby in 1979, as holding that every denial
of a writ without opinion is a denial on the merits.
It is reasonable to concede that literalism should give way to com-
mon sense when adherence to statutory formalities would be an idle ges-
ture. But what of all the cases in which a petition for writ of review
raises not only questions of law, which the California Supreme Court
might be able to determine on the pleadings, but questions of fact as well?
Although the findings and conclusions of the CPUC on questions of fact
are said to be final and not subject to judicial review, 58 finality attaches
only to those findings and conclusions that are supported by evidence in
the record of the CPUC proceedings. 59 The California Supreme Court
cannot determine whether findings of fact are supported by evidence in
the record if the court does not have the record of the CPUC proceedings
certified to it. Yet, unless the court grants the writ of review, no such
certification occurs.
Moreover, when the validity of a CPUC decision is challenged on
the ground that it violates any of the petitioner's rights under the Federal
Constitution, the California Supreme Court may make an independent
review of the evidence relevant to the constitutional issue,6 although it is
not authorized to substitute its own judgment for that of the commission
as to the weight afforded conflicting evidence. 61 Again, the court cannot
make an independent review of the evidence when constitutional issues
are raised unless it has the CPUC's record certified to it by granting the
writ of review.
A remarkable instance of the court's use of the denial-without-opin-
ion process occurred recently in Kern River Gas Transmission Company
57. See supra text accompanying notes 20-24.
58. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 1757 (Deering 1970).
59. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 62 Cal. 2d 634, 647, 401 P.2d 353,
360, 44 Cal. Rptr. 1, 8 (1965); Southern Pac. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 41 Cal. 2d 354, 362,
260 P.2d 70, 75 (1953), appeal dismissed, 346 U.S. 919 (1954).
60. § 1760. This provision was not part of the Public Utilities Act when the Napa Valley
case was decided. See supra notes 3 & 7 and accompanying text; see also American Toll Bridge
Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 12 Cal. 2d 184, 190, 83 P.2d 1, 3-4 (1938), af'd, 307 U.S. 486 (1939).
61. Goldin v. Public Util. Comm'n, 23 Cal. 3d 638, 652-53, 592 P.2d 289, 298, 153 Cal.
Rptr. 802, 811 (1979).
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v. Public Utilities Commission.62 The case raised serious mixed questions
of law and fact as to the applicability of the California Environmental
Quality Act (CEQA) to a series of CPUC decisions mandating a dra-
matic restructuring of California's natural gas industry.63 In addition to
other requirements, the California public utility gas corporations, as
traditional providers of gas sales service, were ordered to provide trans-
portation service through their pipelines for gas owned by end users or
third parties. While these mandates would inevitably produce significant
environmental impacts, the CPUC conducted no environmental evalua-
tion.64 When challenged, the CPUC claimed immunity from CEQA on
the ground that the decisions involved rates.65 The petitioner, Kern
River, argued that the presence of a rate element did not create immunity
from CEQA. 66 The court granted a writ of review in 1986, when Chief
Justice Bird and Justices Reynoso and Grodin were still on the court.
Before the matter had been set for oral argument, however, the composi-
tion of the court changed. Approximately one year after the grant of the
writ, the new court issued the following order without explanation: "The
writ of review is discharged and the petition for writ of review is dis-
missed as improvidently granted."'67
One must inevitably ask, what was in fact the reason for the court's
reversal of position. Was it due to the new court's huge backlog and an
eagerness to clear its calendar?68 The court could not have acted on the
merits, since significant mixed questions of law and fact were involved
and the court did not examine the record. Under the rule of Consumers
Lobby, however, the court's action must be "deemed" to have been on
the merits even though this may not be the case.
C. Failure to Observe the Requirements of the California Constitution
It is extremely difficult to reconcile the doctrine that a summary
62. S.F. No. 25,003 (Cal. filed Aug. 6, 1987).
63. Investigation into Operations of Gas Corporations, CPUC Decision 85-12-102 (Dec.
20, 1985).
64. Investigation into Operations of Gas Corporations, CPUC Decision 86-03-045 (Mar.
5, 1986).
65. Id.
66. Kern River, S.F. No. 25,003 (Cal. filed Aug. 6, 1987) (petition for writ of review).
67. S.F. No. 25,003 (Cal. filed Aug. 6, 1987) (order denying writ of review and dismissing
petition for writ as improvidently granted).
68. See San Francisco Chron., Sept. 2, 1987, at 9, col. 1. Justice Marcus Kaufman was
reported as saying at a luncheon meeting that he and his fellow justices are so busy that they
handle nearly 200 cases each day, and there is still a huge backlog. He was quoted as saying:
"A court can't function forever with this kind of backlog and this kind of pressure." Id. For
further commentary on the court's caseload, see infra note 110.
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denial of a petition for review without opinion is a judgment on the mer-
its with the state constitution's requirement that the supreme court must
explain in writing the reasons for its decisions that determine causes.69
The requirement of written opinions was incorporated into the state con-
stitution by the constitutional convention of 1879.70 Although the provi-
sion was not the subject of much debate, one speaker, Samuel Wilson,
suggested that the court's increasing workload had forced it to adopt the
undesirable practice of deciding cases without explaining its reasoning:
I think every lawyer will agree with me, that in every case there should
be an opinion in writing. It tends to purity and honesty in the adminis-
tration of justice. But ... [the supreme court] is unable to dispose of
the cases annually coming before it and render written decisions, for
no five men on the face of the earth can deliberately determine five
hundred and sixty cases a year, and render written opinions on them
commensurate with the importance and character of the cases brought
in this Court.71
In 1942, the California Supreme Court described the summary de-
nial of petitions for writs of review of CPUC decisions as an exception to
the general rule that decisions of the California Supreme Court which
determine causes should be in writing with reasons stated.72 The
supreme court, however, never attempted to justify the exception in light
of the apparently categorical language of the state constitution. Years
later in Consumers Lobby, the court suggested that a written opinion may
not be required when the decision is "deemed" to be on the merits, or
"'when the sole possible ground for the denial is on the merits .... ,
This reasoning is unconvincing, however, since the state constitution re-
quires the supreme court to explain the reasons for its decisions, not
merely to state whether or not its decisions are on the merits.
69. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 14, provides in part: "Decisions of the Supreme Court and
courts of appeal that determine causes shall be in writing with reasons stated."
70. Id.
71. 2 DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE
OF CALIFORNIA 951 (1879). Mr. Wilson went on to explain that while the constitutional
amendment would end the undesirable practice of rendering decisions without explanation,
such an amendment had to be accompanied by other reforms that would permit the supreme
court to render "pure and honest" opinions in all cases before it. Mr. Wilson's committee
therefore recommended increasing the number of justices from five to seven and authorizing
the court to sit in two chambers. See also Radin, The Requirement of Written Opinion, 18
CALIF. L. REV. 486 (1930) (reviewing the history of the requirement and arguing for a nar-
rower interpretation than the California Supreme Court had given it).
72. Funeral Directors Ass'n v. Board of Funeral Directors, 22 Cal. 2d 104, 107-10, 136
P.2d 785, 787-89 (1942).
73. Consumers Lobby Against Monopolies v. Public Util. Comm'n, 25 Cal. 3d 891, 901
n.3, 603 P.2d 41, 46 n.3, 160 Cal. Rptr. 124, 129 n.3 (1979) (quoting People v. Medina, 6 Cal.
3d 484, 491 n.6, 492 P.2d 686, 690 n.6, 99 Cal. Rptr. 630, 634 n.6 (1972)).
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 39
The California Supreme Court has held that the state constitution
does not require that petitions for prerogative writs, such as writs of pro-
hibition and mandate, must be accompanied with an opinion. 74 Sum-
mary denial of a prerogative writ, however, unlike the denial of a petition
for writ of review of a CPUC decision, is normally considered to be a
discretionary act by the court75 made for policy reasons rather than a
decision on the merits determining a cause. Thus, analogy to prerogative
writ practice fails to support the summary denial procedure in CPUC
cases.
Another possible justification of the position that the constitutional
requirement of written opinions does not apply to judicial review of
CPUC decisions is found in article XII, section 5 of the California Con-
stitution. The section provides that "The Legislature has plenary power,
unlimited by the other provisions of this Constitution..., to establish
the manner and scope of review of commission action in a court of record
.... "76 Any exercise by the legislature of its plenary power to disregard
other provisions of the state constitution, however, must be "cognate and
germane" to the constitutional powers conferred on the Commission by
article XII to regulate public utilities.77 Exempting the California
Supreme Court from the requirement that it render written opinions
would not seem to meet the "cognate and germane" test. In any case,
legislation has never been enacted to exempt the supreme court from that
requirement.
Therefore, it appears that at the very least the California Constitu-
tion requires an opinion in writing, however brief, setting forth the rea-
sons for the court's denial of a writ of review respecting a CPUC
decision.
D. Failure to Provide a "Plain, Speedy and Efficient Remedy" in Rate
Cases Within the Meaning of the Johnson Act of 1934
The CPUC joined other state utility commissions in the early 1930s
to press for federal legislation that would remove rate cases from the
reach of the federal district courts. The result was passage of the John-
son Act of 1934.78 The Act removes from federal district courts the ju-
risdiction to review rate cases decided by a state commission if the state
74. People v. Medina, 6 Cal. 3d 484, 490, 492 P.2d 686, 689-90, 99 Cal. Rptr. 630, 633-34
(1972); Funeral Directors, 22 Cal. 2d at 106, 136 P.2d at 786.
75. Consumers Lobby, 25 Cal. 3d at 901 n.3, 603 P.2d at 46 n.3, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 129 n.3.
76. CAL. CONST. art. XII, § 5.
77. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Eshleman, 166 Cal. 640, 655-56, 137 P. 1119, 1124 (1913).
78. Johnson Act, ch. 283, 48 Stat. 775 (1934) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1342
(1982)).
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law provides, among other things, "a plain, speedy and efficient remedy"
in a state court.79
As background to the Johnson Act, it is important to note that util-
ity companies previously had viewed federal court proceedings to enjoin
decisions of the CPUC as an attractive alternative to review by the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court.80 There were several advantages to federal, rather
than state, court review. First, in the California Supreme Court, if re-
view was granted, it was conducted solely on the record before the Com-
mission and no additional evidence could be introduced.81 The federal
court, on the other hand, permitted the utility to present whatever evi-
dence it wished and, in some cases, the federal court was not required to
review the record of the Commission proceeding.82 Second, when the
utility raised federal constitutional objections to a Commission decision,
the federal court was required to exercise its independent judgment as to
the weight of the evidence relating to the constitutional issue.8 3 Thus,
review in federal court constituted a trial de novo on issues that had
already been determined by the Commission.
Sometimes, a utility company pursued both its state and federal
remedies concurrently until it could assess its chances of success in each
forum. It would then dismiss the proceeding less likely to succeed and
rely exclusively on the other.8 4
Prompted by resentment from state commissions and the public to-
ward federal interference in state utility regulation; by the expense and
delay that federal interference caused;85 and perhaps also by concern
over the flood of state utility rate cases clogging the federal courts, Con-
gress finally took steps to restrict the right of federal court review of state
public utilities commission rate decisions by enacting the Johnson Act in
1934.86 The proponents of the Act argued that state public utility regula-
79. Id.
80. It was normally not difficult to find a federal question. A utility company wishing to
challenge a commission rate order could allege that the rates were confiscatory and that the
Commission had violated the company's rights under the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment of the federal constitution. Alternatively, questions arising under the commerce
or impairment of contracts clauses could often be found.
81. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 1757 (Deering 1970).
82. See, e.g., Prendergast v. New York Tel. Co., 262 U.S. 43, 50 (1923).
83. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 46 (1932). See generally Dickinson, Crowell v. Ben-
son: Judicial Review of Administrative Determinations of Questions of "Constitutional Fact,"
80 U. PA. L. REV. 1055 (1932) (arguing that Crowell should be limited to instances when
federal courts sit as courts of admiralty).
84. S. REP. No. 701, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1932).
85. See Comment, Limitation of Lower Federal Court Jurisdiction over Public Utility Rate
Cases, 44 YALE L.J. 119, 124-27 (1934).
86. 28 U.S.C. § 1342 (1982).
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tion was a matter of particular concern to the states. So long as the states
created sufficient safeguards to prevent state public utilities commissions
from violating federal constitutional rights, considerations of federalism
dictated leaving the primary responsibility for judicial review of rate-
making decisions to the state courts. As John E. Benton, General Solici-
tor for the National Association of Railroad and Utilities Commission-
ers, stated:
When the people of a State have exercised that degree of care to guard
the legal rights of public-service corporations... by placing the regula-
tion of rates in the hands of a qualified commission, properly equipped
with experts to enable it to exercise its powers intelligently, and when
they have guarded against any inadvertent misuse of the power thus
delegated, by providing for a review in court of orders of such commis-
sion, it is offensive to their proper sense of State pride, and tends to
diminish their respect for and confidence in the Federal courts, if such
courts nevertheless summarily issue injunctions whereby the orders of
their commission are suspended and held in litigation for years. 87
Supporters of the Johnson Act also argued that it should be assumed
that state courts are as scrupulous as federal courts in upholding federal
constitutional rights. If the utility company remained dissatisfied with
the determination of the federal constitutional question after exhausting
its state judicial remedies, it could still seek appeal to the United States
Supreme Court.88
As finally adopted, the Johnson Act of 1934 provides:
The district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the operation
of, or compliance with, any order affecting rates chargeable by a public
utility and made by a state administrative agency or a rate-making
body of a state political subdivision, where: (1) Jurisdiction is based
solely on diversity of citizenship or repugnance of the order to the Fed-
eral Constitution; and (2) The order does not interfere with interstate
commerce; and (3) The order has been made after reasonable notice
and hearing; and (4) A plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had
in the courts of such state.8 9
Before the Johnson Act deprives the federal district courts of juris-
diction over decisions of a state's public utilities commission, the state
must provide a "plain, speedy and efficient" judicial remedy for viola-
tions of federal rights. The chief counsel of the CPUC, knowing that
such a condition was to be written into the Johnson Act, feared that the
87. Limiting Jurisdiction of Federal Courts, 1932: Hearings on S. 937, S. 939 and S. 3243
Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 125-26 (1932)
(staterhent of John E. Benton, General Solicitor for the National Association of Railroad and
Utilities Commissioners).
88. Id. at 120-21.
89. § 1342.
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existing California review procedure would not meet the standard de-
clared by the United States Supreme Court to protect rights under the
federal constitution. 90 Thus, he urged the CPUC to take action which
led to the adoption of the 1933 amendment to the Public Utilities Act.91
The 1933 amendment provides that whenever a violation of a federal
constitutional right is alleged in a petition for writ of review of a CPUC
decision, the California Supreme Court "shall exercise an independent
judgment on the law and the facts, and the findings or conclusions of the
commission material to the determination of the constitutional question
shall not be final."'92
The California procedure for reviewing CPUC rate decisions meets
the Johnson Act condition of providing a "plain, speedy and efficient"
judicial remedy when the California Supreme Court grants a petition for
writ of review. In that situation, the parties are given the opportunity to
present oral argument, and the court writes an opinion. In the vast ma-
jority of cases, however, the California Supreme Court denies a petition
without opinion. When this occurs, the petitioner has not been afforded
a full hearing93 and has no means of knowing whether the supreme court
made a judicial determination of the federal question raised in the peti-
tion.94 In such cases it is doubtful that there is a "plain, speedy and
efficient" judicial remedy.
The meaning of a "plain, speedy and efficient" judicial remedy was
examined in a 1981 case, Rosewell v. La Salle National Bank.95 The
United States Supreme Court was called upon to interpret this phrase in
the Tax Injunction Act of 1937.96 The words were identical to and actu-
ally modeled after those in the Johnson Act. The Court held the state's
judicial procedure met the "plain, speedy and efficient" requirements be-
cause they provided a "full hearing and judicial determination" at which
the taxpayers could raise any and all constitutional objections to the tax
90. Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 287, 289-91 (1920). The
CPUC's chief counsel in 1934, Arthur T. George, Esq., through several conversations during
1987 and 1988, has informed the authors of his concern and involvement as expressed in the
text.
91. Act of May 18, 1933, ch. 442, 1933 Cal. Stat. 1157 (current version at CAL. PUB.
UTIL. CODE § 1760 (Deering 1970)).
92. Id.
93. The supreme court does not have the record certified to it and does not receive oral
argument.
94. Consumers Lobby Against Monopolies v. Public Util. Comm'n, 25 Cal. 3d 891, 905,
603 P.2d 41, 49, 160 Cal. Rptr. 124, 132 (1979).
95. 450 U.S. 503 (1981).
96. Tax Injunction Act of 1937, ch. 726, 50 Stat. 1738 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1341
(1982)).
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being challenged. 97
Rosewell implies that anything less than a "full hearing and judicial
determination" would fail to meet the "plain, speedy and efficient" test in
the Johnson Act. The denial-without-opinion practice of the California
Supreme Court appears to fail that test: the practice plainly does not
provide a "full hearing," nor does it provide a "judicial determination" if
the denial is only "deemed" to be on the merits.
E. Failure to Provide Assurance of Judicial Review on the Merits to
Protect Federal Rights
Under the federal judicial system, a party may seek redress in fed-
eral court to protect a federal right if a proceeding has been brought
before a state tribunal and the state fails to provide an adequate rem-
edy.98 A state remedy is inadequate if the proceeding denies an applicant
an absolute right to a state court determination of the federal claim on
the merits. 99
In Hillsborough v. Cromwell, the United States Supreme Court con-
sidered whether New Jersey's scheme of judicial review of decisions by
the state board of tax appeals adequately protected the federal due pro-
cess and equal protection rights under the fourteenth amendment.10
While the New Jersey Supreme Court had jurisdiction to review such
decisions by writ of certiorari, the granting of the writ was not a matter
of right but was within the discretion of the court. The United States
Supreme Court concluded that "there was such uncertainty surrounding
the adequacy of the state remedy as to justify the federal district court in
retaining jurisdiction of the cause."101
It follows from Hillsborough that if denials-without-opinion by the
California Supreme Court are only "deemed" to be, and are not in fact,
determinations on the merits, the state remedy is inadequate to protect
federal rights and, thus, parties .claiming violation of federal rights may
seek redress in a federal court.
F. Failure to Justify Abstention from Exercise of Jurisdiction by the
Federal District Court
The Johnson Act'sr strictions on federal district court jurisdiction
97. Rosewell, 450 U.S. at 514.
98. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 541-43 (1971); see HART & WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 434-36 (2d ed. 1973).
99. Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 U.S. 620, 624, 629 (1946).
100. Id. at 622.
101. Id. at 626.
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in public utilities cases are supplemented by considerations of federalism.
Although the federal courts may have jurisdiction over a particular mat-
ter, they should exercise their jurisdiction "with proper regard for the
rightful independence of state governments in carrying out their domes-
tic policy." ' 102 When a state provides a unified method of formulating
policy in an area involving substantial state interests, federal courts
should apply the Burford v. Sun Oil Co. abstention doctrine and abstain
from exercising their jurisdiction if intervention by the lower federal
courts would interfere with state policies. 0 3
The principle of federal abstention has been applied to federal dis-
trict court injunctive proceedings against state public utilities commis-
sion decisions, even when the Johnson Act has been inapplicable because
the challenged decision was not one setting rates. °4 As in cases under
the Johnson Act, however, federal abstention will apply only if the state
judicial review procedures are "adequate."' 01 5 What remains unclear is
whether the standard of adequacy under the Burford abstention doctrine
is necessarily the same as the "plain, speedy and efficient" standard dis-
cussed in Rosewell, 106  or the certainty standard applied in
Hillsborough. 107
Regardless of the exact standard used, however, "adequacy" for the
purposes of federal abstention is measured in broader terms. In Burford
and Alabama Public Service Commission v. Southern Railway, 108 the
United States Supreme Court emphasized that the state scheme of judi-
cial review is an integral part of the regulatory process established by the
state and that in determining the adequacy of the state review procedure,
the federal courts should look at the state system as a whole. 10 9 The
102. Pennsylvania v. Williams, 294 U.S. 176, 185 (1941); see Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman
Co., 321 U.S. 496, 500-01 (1941).
103. 319 U.S. 315, 332-34 (1943).
104. See, e.g., Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Southern Ry. Co., 341 U.S. 341, 350-51
(1951); Zucker v. Bell Tel. Co., 373 F. Supp. 748, 756 (E.D. Pa. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S.
1027 (1975).
105. Alabama, 341 U.S. at 349 n.1l.
106. Rosewell v. La Salle Nat'l Bank, 450 U.S. 507, 512 (1981); see supra text accompany-
ing note 102.
107. Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 U.S. 620, 626 (1946); see supra text accompanying
notes 98-101.
108. 341 U.S. 341 (1951).
109. "Statutory appeal from an order of the Commission is an integral part of the regula-
tory process under the Alabama Code. Appeals, concentrated in one circuit court, are 'super-
visory in character.'" Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 341 U.S. at 348 (quoting Avery Freight
Lines v. White, 245 Ala. 618, 622-23, 18 So. 2d 394, 398 (1944)). "In describing the relation of
the Texas court to the Commission no useful purpose will be served by attempting to label the
court's position as legislative ... or judicial . . . -suffice it to say that the Texas courts are
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courts, therefore, must be particularly careful before condemning a state
system of judicial review as inadequate.
Nevertheless, the adequacy requirement for state judicial remedies
must have some meaning. So long as the California Supreme Court con-
tinues to deny without opinion most petitions for a writ of review of
CPUC decisions, there is little basis on which a federal court can assess
the adequacy of the California procedure. Thus, if the federal courts ac-
cept the California Supreme Court's assertion that it reviews all petitions
on the merits they seem to be abdicating their duty to ensure the vindica-
tion of federal rights. It is time for the federal courts to recognize that
continued deference is not appropriate.
III. Possible Remedies
Given the long history of the California Supreme Court's treatment
of petitions for writs of review respecting CPUC decisions and the court's
enormous case load, it would be unreasonable to expect the court to in-
dulge in the time consuming procedures set forth in the Public Utilities
Code each time a petition for writ of review is filed. Requiring the court
to direct the CPUC to certify the record to the court, conduct oral argu-
ment, and render a detailed opinion seems quite unnecessary even if an
effective argument can be made that the process is technically required
by the California Constitution and the California Public Utilities Code.
The workload of the court has dramatically increased over the years, and
efforts should be made to reduce its burdens rather than increase
them. "10
One significant change, which would not exacerbate the court's bur-
dens appreciably, and yet would be welcome by the bar, is a statement in
every CPUC case setting forth the rationale for the action taken. When
the court decides that a writ of review should be denied,'it need only state
the reasons for the denial. If the denial is becaus& no error of law has
been committed, the court should at least state that conclusion. If the
denial is based upon a procedural deficiency the court should state that
deficiency. If the denial is due to discretionary considerations that re-
quire the court to invoke the concept of a decision "deemed to be on the
working partners with the Railroad Commission in the business of creating a regulatory sys-
tem for the oil industry." Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 325-26 (1943) (citations
omitted).
110. For earlier comments on the burdensome caseload in the Califo.rnia Supreme Court,
see Comment, The California Supreme Court and Selective Review, 72 CALIF. L. REv. 720
(1984); Comment, Case Disposition by the California Supreme Court: Proposed Alternatives, 67
CALIF. L. REv. 788 (1979); Kleps, Can Our Supreme Court Survive?, L.A. Daily J., Aug. 18,
1982, at 4, col. 4.
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merits," in order to comply with statutory and constitutional considera-
tions, that fact should be made known to the parties.
Second, until the procedure for reviewing CPUC decisions is re-
formed, or at least until such time as the court adopts the practice of
stating the reasons for its denial of a petition for writ of review, the bar
should attempt to persuade federal courts that the present procedure
often fails to meet the "plain, speedy and efficient" standard required by
the Johnson Act for rate casesII and the related standard of "adequacy"
for judicial remedies required by the due process clause of the federal
constitution." l2 In such cases, the federal courts could then exercise ju-
risdiction to review CPUC decisions.
Third, remedial legislation should be enacted by the California Leg-
islature to ensure that decisions of the CPUC are in fact subject to judi-
cial scrutiny on the merits whenever a colorable basis for challenging a
CPUC decision has been made in the petition for a writ of review and
when no procedural infirmities exist. In view of the desirability, if not
necessity, of relieving the California Supreme Court of some of its work-
load, the Select Committee appointed by Chief Justice Lucas has recom-
mended that the California Supreme Court seek constitutional and
legislative changes to place original review of CPUC decisions in the
courts of appeal. 113 Review authority could be lodged in one appellate
court designated to hear all petitions for writ of review or in the appellate
court sitting in the district where the utility has its principal office.
While the issue of which court or courts should be granted review au-
thority was not addressed by the Select Committee Report, lodging re-
view authority in one court seems preferable to promote consistency and
enable the chosen court to gain expertise in this area. Regardless of the
approach taken, however, if such legislation is adopted, its most impor-
tant aspect must be to ensure that judicial review is accorded as a matter
of right.
As an interim measure (pending adoption of remedial legislation), it
has been suggested that the California Supreme Court invoke power
under the state constitution to transfer to a court of appeal any CPUC
decisions coming before it that do not present issues of great impor-
tance.114 This proposal assumes a power which the supreme court ap-
111. See supra notes 78-97 and accompanying text.
112. See supra notes 98-101 and accompanying text.
113. See SELECT COMM. ON INTERNAL PROCEDURES OF THE SUPREME COURT, REPORT
TO HON. M. LUCAS, CHIEF JUSTICE OF CALIFORNIA 24-25 (Feb. 16, 1988) (on file at The
Hastings Law Journal).
114. Letter from Judicial Council of California to Janice E. Kerr, General Counsel, Cali-
fornia Public Utilities Commission (Sept. 14, 1987) (on file at The Hastings Law Journal). The
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pears not to possess. Section 1759 of the Public Utilities Code declares
that "No court of this State, except the Supreme Court ... shall have
jurisdiction to review .. .any order or decision of the commission
.... -115 Nonetheless, the Legislature could amend section 1759 to grant
the court this power. Serious consideration should also be given to legis-
lation requiring the transfer of all cases to a court of appeal when it is not
feasible for the supreme court to make a determination on the merits.
Such legislation should mandate that the court of appeal review the deci-
sion on the merits and provide a written opinion.
Conclusion
This article advocates short-term and long-term action to address
the current inadequacies of the California Supreme Court's review of de-
cisions of the California Public Utilities Commission. For the present,
efforts should be made to persuade the supreme court to set forth its
reasons whenever it denies a petition for writ of review. The document
denying the writ should reveal whether the denial is in fact on the merits,
is to be taken as "deemed" on the merits, or is based on procedural
grounds. If the court adopts this practice, parties will be in a position to
know what further steps, if any, to take. The dissatisfaction with the
court's current practice will be reduced while the court's workload will
not be appreciably increased.
In addition, this Article advocates that until remedial legislation is
enacted and so long as the California Supreme Court continues to deny
petitions for writ of review without opinion, attorneys should not hesitate
to file actions in the federal district court to challenge CPUC decisions
that involve a federal question. Attorneys should urge the federal district
court to entertain jurisdiction because the state remedy is not "plain,
speedy and efficient" under the Johnson Act,' 16 or is not "adequate"
under the doctrine of Hillsborough v. Cromwell." 7
For the long-term, remedial legislation should be enacted to ensure
court review on the merits of challenged CPUC decisions. Legislation
could take either of two forms. The Public Utilities Code could be
amended to provide that whenever the California Supreme Court decides
letter advises that Chief Justice Malcolm Lucas has recently appointed a Select Committee on
Supreme Court Procedures, and that such Committee seeks comments from those interested.
The letter has been circulated with a cover letter dated September 29, 1987 from the CPUC's
General Counsel, Janice E. Kerr, addressed "To Those Who Practice Before the CPUC."
115. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 1759 (Deering 1970).
116. See supra notes 78-97 and accompanying text.
117. See supra notes 98-101 and accompanying text.
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not to issue a writ of review, the court shall, except in cases where denial
is for procedural reasons, certify the matter to a court of appeal, and the
latter court shall be required to issue a writ, conduct a hearing, and write
an opinion on the merits. Alternatively, the Public Utilities Code could
be amended to provide that all petitions for writ of review of CPUC deci-
sions be addressed to a court of appeal instead of the supreme court. The
court of appeal should be required to issue a writ, hear argument, and
write an opinion except when it appears on the face of the pleading that
denial of a writ can be made without reference to the record, as in the
case of an obvious procedural defect. Under either alternative, review
authority should be lodged in only one court of appeal and the court of
appeal should be required to state its reasoning. This will avoid conflict-
ing decisions, promote consistency, and enable the chosen court to gain
particular expertise in matters pertaining to the CPUC.
